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Abstract 
Rating agencies provide service by offering information about different kinds of securities 
and/or investment opportunities. This paper addresses questions often asked during the 2008 
U.S. financial crisis: Why did no one see this coming? Why were all the explanations given 
afterward, not given before as precautions? Or if they were given before, why did nobody 
listen?  
Using Giddens’ idea of disembedded systems [Giddens A (1991a) The Consequences of 
Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK)], the paper describes and frames the phenomenon 
of U.S. financial crisis and the role of rating agencies in particular as a disembedded service 
system. Hereby it offers an explanation of the crises in contrast to the common incentive-
oriented or moralizing perspectives. The paper shows that the U.S. financial crisis emerged 
from a disembedded service system, a simulacrum of ratings, which after a while was no more 
connected to the reality of securities. Information-providing service systems are in danger to 
become simulacra, and with it they can disembed. The paper offers a new insightful 
perspective on how to analyze and understand information-providing service systems and 
hence offers a perspective to avoid crises based on disembedded systems. 
This is the first paper to our knowledge to analyze information-providing service systems 
based on Giddens’ theory of abstract disembedded systems. It provides a new understanding 
of information-providing service systems that can help to avoid crises based on disembedded 
systems. 
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1. Introduction  
Financial services have become a key contributor to gross domestic product in modern 
economies (Berg and Einspruch 2010). However, with the rising complexity and diversity of 
these services, they have become increasingly difficult for investors and others to understand 
and evaluate. Thus, rating agencies have emerged quickly as a valuable service to evaluate 
securities support investors’ decision making. Rating services play an important role not only 
in the financial markets but also, as country ratings, for governments and international 
investors. In addition, rating services are used widely in the academic environment to evaluate 
universities and academic journals. They are also used to market products other than financial 
services and products, such as car-safety ratings, medicine ratings, and ratings made by 
customers themselves. Ratings are ubiquitous. 
Taking service-dominant logic and service science’s definition of service as the “application 
of skills and knowledge for the benefit of another party” (Vargo and Lusch 2008, p. 6), ratings 
are a service. However, considering the importance of ratings in modern societies, it is 
surprising that they have not been addressed as a service either in the field of service-dominant 
logic or in service science. This article represents a step toward closing this gap. We analyze 
the role of rating agencies and their ratings in the 2008 U.S. financial crisis. We conceptualize 
ratings as a service and, specifically, financial ratings as a service for investors to support their 
decision making. We analyze these services from a systems perspective for two main reasons. 
First, the 2008 U.S. financial crisis has been described as “a systemic breakdown” (Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, p. xxii). The Final Report of the National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States uses the word “system” 485 
times (including 96 mentions of “financial system” and 84 mentions of “banking system”), 
though it makes no reference to system theory. The report neglects to define the term “system”, 
not even as a glossary definition. Thus, it is used implicitly, which in itself provides enough 
reason to interpret it through a system theoretical lens and to investigate the 2008 U.S. financial 
crisis from a system theoretical perspective. 
Second, a more fundamental reason to investigate ratings as service from a systems theory 
perspective is that ratings have become a medium of interchange in their own right, independent 
of what they rate and the people who are rating. Ratings refer to something, but they are 
understood without this reference, rendering them a “faceless” (Giddens 1991a) service; 
whereas, for example, a haircut is a “facework” (Giddens 1991a), service ratings are faceless. 
Giddens (1991a) uses this distinction to describe and analyze the “consequences of modernity.” 
In modern times, just as pilots are not known by the airline passenger, services are performed 
by unknown, faceless experts. 
Giddens (1991a) extensively analyzes these faceless activities and introduces the term 
“abstract system.” Because lay actors cannot understand or prove the quality of these activities, 
they must trust the abstract system. Note that trust in this systems perspective sense is not 
based upon faith in good intentions or the “moral uprightness” of others but is instead based 
upon faith in the correctness of which one is ignorant (Giddens 1991a) because one is not an 
expert. 
Rather than use a systems theoretical approach to explain the U.S. financial crises, common 
explanations highlight individuals’ or organizations’ moral or legal responsibility or focus on 
“wrong” incentives as being “responsible” for the crisis (Allen and Carletti 2010). In contrast, 
a systems theory perspective deemphasizes trust in moral or legal responsibility of individuals 
or organizations as a conglomeration of individuals and points to trust in abstract systems 
(Giddens 1991a, b). In his studies, Giddens distinguishes two types of abstract systems: expert 
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systems and symbolic tokens. Both systems are considered service providers in that they are 
created to do things for others. Ratings agencies as service providers can be understood as 
expert systems and the ratings themselves as symbolic tokens. To understand trust in expert 
systems and symbolic tokens, it helps to understand its conceptualization in modern and 
postmodern society. In particular, trust in individuals as commonly understood cannot 
encompass the challenges accompanied by abstract systems. 
The current study uses a systems theory perspective (1) to describe the service of ratings in 
a systems theory terminology and (2) to explain it as reembedding a disembedded system in 
Giddens’s sense. We argue that ratings provided by rating agencies for investors became a 
symbolic token (Giddens 1991a, b), which disconnected itself from the reality of securities. It 
emerged as a closed-loop communication between the rating agencies and the investors, no 
longer referring to the securities behind the investments. As a result, when investors made their 
claims, securities could not meet them: the investors’ acquired rights could not be fulfilled, and 
the crisis became apparent. 
We describe how the service rating became disembedded from reality to become a symbolic 
token. When such a system develops in congruence with reality, there is no danger; however, 
when it does not, danger is in sight. Metaphorically, if a man jumping on a helicopter from a 
moving train (e.g., as in a James Bond or Mission Impossible movie) wants to get back on the 
moving train, it is important that the helicopter flies at the same speed in the same direction that 
the train does. Otherwise, the man is in trouble. The helicopter is the abstract system that can 
develop (move) in congruence with the train (reality)—or not. The abstract system can 
disembed (disconnect the man from the train), it can drift away (fly away), or it can develop in 
congruence with the reality from which it disembedded. However, to reembed (to allow the 
man to get back on the train), it must develop in congruence with reality. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section describes ratings as a faceless 
service and connects it to a systems theoretical terminology of abstract systems. Section 3 
describes abstract systems and explains how they operate as expert systems and symbolic 
tokens. Section 4 discusses trust in abstract systems. Section 5 describes investors, securities, 
rating agencies, and ratings in a systems theoretical terminology and derives explanatory 
hypotheses for the crises. Section 6 uses the Financial Commission Inquiry Report (FCIR), 
submitted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission pursuant to Public Law 111-21, to 
further analyze the hypotheses. Section 7 concludes with a discussion and implications for 
further research. 
 
2. Rating Service and Systems 
According to service-dominant logic’s definition of service, rating is a service in that it is the 
application of skills and knowledge for the benefit of another party (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 
2008, 2011). However, after the rating has been completed, it can become an independent 
medium of interchange in the sense that it can be used without knowing the people behind the 
rating and without understanding the objects rated. In particular, financial ratings were 
developed because investors did not fully understand securities. In line with Giddens’ (1991a) 
terminology, services that can be used without knowing the people who performed them are 
“faceless services.” In a modern world, faceless services are ubiquitous, ranging from street 
repair to train driving, from software service to Internet service provider. 
Differentiation and variety in the division of labor providing service has developed to such 
a degree that most people are lay actors in most fields. When lay actors cannot understand a 
specific service or prove its quality, ratings can be helpful. However, they must trust this rating; 
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as Giddens (1991a) and Luhmann (1995) point out, in these areas of faceless interaction, trust 
plays a crucial role to reduce uncertainty. 
These kinds of faceless services cannot adequately be analyzed by identifying the 
individual customer or supplier. There is—by definition—not even a dyad of people such as 
suppliers or customers to be analyzed. Behind faceless services, there might be networks of 
people working together. Thus, these faceless services become systems of service and must 
analyzed from a systems theory perspective. 
A perspective must, on the one hand, be holistic enough to address face-to-face service and 
faceless service and trust as social phenomena and, on the other hand, be concrete or practical 
enough to describe the realities of postmodern societies. Although there is a wider body of 
literature on systems theory and cognate areas (e.g., Ashby 1956, Beer 1972, von Bertalanffy 
1969, Boulding 1964, Checkland 1981, Giddens 1991a, Golinelli 2010, Hall and Fagen 1956, 
Luhmann 1995, Maturana and Varela 1992, Meadows 2008, Weinberg 2001, Wiener 
1948/1961), it is largely very abstract and not (yet) directly connected to service, society, or 
trust. However, two important literature streams directly address these topics. The first is the 
viable system approach created by Stafford Beer (1972) and now applied to service. This 
approach originated in cybernetics and uses a management perspective to govern service 
systems (Barile and Polese 2010a, b; Polese and Di Nauta 2013). A second stream is that of 
social systems as conceptualized by Luhmann (1995) and Giddens (1991a, b). Both approaches 
distinguish face-to-face relationships from faceless relationships. Giddens (1991a) discusses 
“faceless commitments” as “abstract systems” (p. 80). These abstract systems offer an adequate 
frame for the purpose of analyzing ratings as faceless services, as conceptualized in the next 
section. 
 
3. Abstract Systems 
Societal systems can be divided into face-to-face systems and faceless commitments. Giddens 
(1991a) notes that “the former refers to trust relations which are sustained by or expressed in 
social connections established in circumstances of co-presence. The second concerns the 
development of faith in symbolic tokens or expert systems, which, taken together, I shall term 
abstract systems” (p. 80, emphasis in original). 
Giddens (1991a) defines expert systems as “systems of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environment in which 
we live today.” (p. 27). Modern life is full of expert systems. Most houses involve a network 
of expert systems: consumers rely on the heating system as well as the energy flow. When 
traveling, consumers rely on the airplanes as well as on the pilots’ ability to fly them. In 
addition, most people are part of expert systems; attorneys, architects, physicians, and rating 
agencies can be understood as expert systems in this sense. Because lay actors do not have the 
expertise of expert systems, they must trust them. This trust is not mainly in people but in the 
system; more precisely, “we can speak of trust in symbolic tokens or expert systems, but this 
rests upon faith in the correctness of principles of which one is ignorant, not upon faith in the 
‘moral uprightness’ (good intentions) of others” (Giddens 1991a, pp. 33–34). Expert systems 
emerge according to the division of labor and specialized skills or knowledge. Thus, they are 
part of the service society. In short, rating agencies are expert systems serving investors by 
giving information on securities. 
Using their expertise, rating agencies produce ratings intended to inform investors about 
securities, thus providing a service to support their decision making. In Giddens’s terminology, 
a rating can be understood as a symbolic token: “By symbolic tokens I mean media of 
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interchange which can be ‘passed around’ without regard to the specific characteristics of 
individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture” (Giddens 1991a, p. 22). 
Symbolic tokens are comparable to the character of currencies. They refer to something but do 
not need the referred object to be exchanged. Money is an example of a symbolic token; it is 
commonly understood what $5 or E5 mean. In addition, it is commonly understood what it 
means when a child comes home from school with an A, and most people understand that AAA 
is a good securities rating. These entirely symbolic tokens provide service. But how do people 
know what these symbolic tokens are “saying”? How do they carry the right information, and 
how is it assured that this information is correctly understood? 
 
4. Trust and Symbolic Tokens 
Symbolic tokens are signs that carry meaning for those using them, which is the utility they 
provide. They thereby reduce the complexity of information into several simple signs (e.g., 
AAA, AAC). Because lay actors typically do not understand the complexity of information in 
question, they must trust the symbolic tokens. Ultimately, this trust is placed in the service 
provided by rating agencies. How is this trust rationalized from a systems theory perspective? 
For Giddens (1991a) and Luhmann (1995), trust in social systems is a mechanism to reduce 
complexity, not a moral issue. Thus, understanding trust in social systems theory is different 
from any moral inquiry. Luhmann (1995) explicitly connects trust to the symbolic: “This is 
why it [trust] depends on symbolic cover: it reacts to critical informations not because of the 
facts that they report, but because they function as indicators of trustworthiness” (p. 129, 
emphasis in original). This understanding of trust is not just a two-person relational affair but 
needs a third instance or entity of reference. “There is no way to trust in anyone in a system 
where one is not able to refer to an independent consensus” (Crozier 1963, cited by Luhmann 
1995, p. 528, footnote 46), a consensus about an entity of reference not necessarily understood 
by people giving trust. 
In such situations, trust enables people to use symbolic tokens as condensed information. For 
example, a teacher’s grading system only tells parents something if they trust in the teacher’s 
expertise and if they know what the system means. Thus, by means of signs or symbolic tokens, 
lay actors trust the expertise of others as well as the symbolic token’s meaning. In short, a 
symbolic token only works with trust. To shed light on how trust and symbolic tokens work 
together as service, it is reasonable to start with Bateson’s (1970) perspective on information. 
We explicitly exclude Shannon’s (1998) perspective here because it neither involves meaning 
nor refers to entities of reference. Shannon notes that “semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem” (p. 31). Weaver (1998, p. 8) interprets this sentence as 
follows: “In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of 
which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, as regards 
information.” In contrast, Bateson (1970, p. 7) defines information as “the difference which 
makes a difference.” This definition supports our analysis. Any difference is based on a 
distinction, and any sign or token is a distinction insofar as it designates something and in doing 
so distinguishes it from the rest of the world. By naming something, we draw a distinction 
between it and the rest of the world. For example, if one calls something a “tree” or a “car,” 
one distinguishes the tree or the car from everything else that is not a tree or a car. This 
definition is an implication of Spencer-Brown’s (1969) calculus, which states that whenever 
one names something, the precondition of marking it by a name is a distinction. The drawing 
of the distinction and the marking of one side of the distinction is always done simultaneously. 
Calling something a “tree” or “car” not only names it but also distinguishes it from all other 
things that are not a tree or a car. Thus, naming something a “tree” or “car” makes a distinction 
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and, with that distinction, a first-tier difference. When people use a word to name something, 
the word becomes an important part of the service of communication and information. 
In summary, the first difference of Bateson’s (1970) definition can be understood as the first-
tier difference made by naming something. This difference must have a second-tier difference 
to have meaning. What kind of difference is the latter one? Consider the following introductory 
example. English-speaking Person A says to English-speaking person B, “Yesterday an ertong1 
came home.” Person A makes a difference by distinguishing an “ertong” from the rest of the 
world. However, this difference does not necessarily make a (second-tier) difference for person 
B if person B has no idea what or who an “ertong” is. If, however, A says, “A child came home 
yesterday,” person A makes a first-tier difference by distinguishing the child from the rest of 
the world, and this distinction makes another, second-tier difference for person B because now 
the word “child” refers to a human being, not just a word. For person B, the word “ertong” did 
not refer to a child, which could be distinguished from other entities in the world; therefore, it 
did not make a second-tier distinction. In short, using a word makes the first-tier distinction, 
and if the word refers to an entity that can be distinguished from the rest of the world (second-
tier distinction), the word is understandable. The sentence “Yesterday an ‘ertong’ died” was 
just a message with no meaningful information, because the first-tier difference did not make a 
second-tier difference. A first-tier difference (sign or word) becomes service if it creates a 
second-tier difference: it is an application of skills and knowledge (using a word) that cocreates 
a benefit of another party (creating second-tier difference) and, with this, service. 
In addition, a word—as a first-tier distinction—might differ in second-tier distinctions from 
person to person. A word such as “emotion” might have different meanings for different people. 
If these second-tier distinctions refer to an entity of reference (outside the person’s mind—e.g., 
a tree, a car), people can use this entity of reference to find an appropriate use of the word in 
question. If there is no (external) entity of reference, people use other first-tier distinctions 
(words), which usually then refer to (external) entities of reference. 
In a simple sender–receiver model, one can distinguish one first-tier difference, the word or 
sign used; two second-tier differences, one the sender has in mind and one the receiver has in 
mind; and an entity of reference to which both second-tier distinctions refer. Figure 1 presents 
the model graphically with the following definitions: 
1. the difference the sign indicates in that it is a sign (not noise) (the sign difference (SD), 
the first-tier difference) 
2. the difference a sign sending observer (SO) wants to indicate by using the sign (intended 
meaning; the sending observer’s difference (SOD), a second-tier difference) 
3. the difference a sign-receiving observer (RO) indicates by receiving the sign and 
(perceived meaning; the receiving observer’s difference (ROD), a second-tier difference) 
4. an entity of reference (ER) (if available) to which the differences refer 
                                                          
1 Ertong ist the Chinese word for child. 
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Often, SOs are experts in their fields (e.g., physicians, attorneys, teachers). These groups of 
people are what Giddens (1991a) calls an expert system that provides service; they are people 
of specific expertise that lay actor typically do not have. However, not all expert systems create 
symbolic tokens. Physicians and attorneys, for example, have terminology but do not use these 
symbolic tokens to communicate to lay actors; they try to use lay actors’ language to 
communicate to their clients. In contrast, teachers as expert systems use symbolic tokens—
namely, the grading system (as described previously)—to communicate to lay actors. Both the 
expertise and the grading system provide service. Figure 1 provides an overview. It connects 
Bateson’s (1970) idea of information to a well-known example (a teacher’s grading system), 
and it connects the terminology to both forms of abstract systems: an expert system and 
symbolic tokens. A teacher (SO) grades a written examination (ER) of a student (RO) with a C 
(SD). The teacher’s idea of the examination’s quality is his or her difference as indicated by a 
C (SOD). The student’s idea of his or her examination is his or her difference indicated by a C 
(ROD). The C is the difference the sign C indicates in this context; it is a sign and not noise 
(SD), the teacher’s idea (SOD) of the written examination causing the grading, the student’s 
idea of the received C (ROD), and finally, the written examination as the entity of reference 
(ER). There might also be other observers (OO) with their own differences, such as classmates 
and parents and other observers’ differences (not shown in Figure 1). 
The similar reasoning holds for the rating agencies: The rating itself is the first difference 
(e.g., AAA, AAC; SD). The rating agency (SO) uses the sign according to its idea of quality 
(SOD) of a security (ER) to support investors (RO). Reading the rating, investors have an idea 
of the quality of the security (ROD), on which they base their investment decisions. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptions. 
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In cases in which an SO and an RO observe the same ER and understand this entity in the 
same way, communication is usually not a problem and might not even be necessary. However, 
in cases such as grading, in which symbolic tokens are created by expert systems, the ER may 
not be fully understood or fully accessible for the RO. Therefore, the SO (usually the expert) 
must explain the ER, typically by using his or her understanding of the ER (SOD). Note that 
the SO’s understanding, his or her idea of this entity of reference (SOD), is not identical to the 
entity (ER). Furthermore, the SO has no access to the receiver’s understanding (ROD), and the 
RO has no access to the SOD—only to the signs sent. If the RO has no access to the ER or does 
not understand it, he or she must trust the SO and his or her descriptions, somehow prove it, or 
exit or ignore the communication. 
If the receiver has good reason to assume that the description of the entity of reference is 
accurate, trusting symbolic tokens presents no problems. However, if the receiver is a lay actor, 
he or she has neither access to the ER nor understanding of it; thus, the receiver cannot confirm 
the SO’s description of the entity because there is no connection between the RO and the ER. 
This inability of proving a description is a first and necessary condition for cases in which trust 
can make it worse: as long as rating agencies provide an appropriate picture of securities by 
ratings, there will be no problem. 
 
5. The 2008 U.S. Financial Crisis in Systems Theoretical Terminology 
We now apply what was previously stated to the U.S. financial crisis as an example. Rating 
agencies are expected to give an appropriate picture of securities. A problem occurs if rating 
agencies do not provide an appropriate picture and investors do not notice this. If investors do 
not understand securities, they do not have an ER and must trust in the symbolic token—in this 
case, the rating. The situation described in Figure 1 changes to that in Figure 2; a closed loop 
between the rating, investor, and investor’s interpretation now exists. Next, we describe the 
process of this change in terms of symbolic tokens as well as the financial system, and we 
derive four hypotheses. 
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The following process describes the change in four steps, which we use as our three 
hypotheses and one concluding hypothesis for a qualitative study: 
Step 1. Investors are disconnected from the entity of reference. This leads to our first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1).    Investors did not understand securities (no connection between the 
ROD and ER). 
Originally, the rating agencies were established to inform investors, to provide an appropriate 
picture about securities for investors’ purposes. 
Step 2. Rating agencies and ratings were introduced as expert systems to create a symbolic 
token to support investors’ decision making. 
This leads to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2).    Rating agencies were established to support uninformed investors 
(an information-providing system between investors (RO) and securities (ER)). 
During the time leading up to the 2008 crisis, the rating agencies began to use the ratings not 
only to inform investors but also to sell more securities. They were paid by banks to do so. 
Because the ratings themselves did not indicate this new function, investors were misguided. 
In essence, the expert system (rating agency) was not linked to investors but rather to banks 
selling securities. This connection forced the rating agencies to slowly change the rating’s 
purpose from informing about securities to selling securities. Figure 3 depicts this conflict of 
interest by showing two REs, the securities and the banks. 
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Step 3. Rating agencies changed their practice in giving ratings, and investors 
did not realize it. This observation leads to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3).    Rating agencies stopped providing an appropriate picture of 
securities when a conflict of interest forced them to overvalue securities. 
At this point, the rating agencies had two options: (1) create ratings giving an appropriate 
picture of securities, which was in the interest of investors but not necessarily in the interest of 
those selling securities; or (2) increasingly use ratings to sell securities. However, if they had 
informed investors about this change, the rating information would have had no value to 
investors. Rating agencies decided to follow those who paid them. But those who paid were 
not necessarily interested in giving an appropriate picture about securities for investors. 
Investors with no knowledge of evaluating securities had no other choice than to trust ratings. 
They had no opportunity of verifying ratings unless they bought and sold an investment. Their 
faith in the “correctness of principles” (Giddens 1991a) assumed that principles and procedures 
rating agencies used to construct a securities rating existed to help them. 
In the same sense, physicians form an expert system, and the patient’s faith in the correctness 
of the principles the physicians uses is an important part of treatment: “The tokens and regimes 
of expertise of abstract systems circulate in a way that escapes the control of any of their 
practitioners and clients” (Stones 2005, p. 325). The patient, similar to the investor, can only 
prove the correctness by the results he or she produces together with the expert system: being 
healthy in the case of the patient and earning money in the case of the investor. In both cases, 
if a bad outcome occurs, the proof comes too late; the bad outcome is the proof. Therefore, they 
must trust or not use the expert system with its symbolic tokens. Therefore, we conclude the 
following. 
Step 4 (Concluding Hypothesis). By the time investors realized that rating agencies had 
changed their practices and that the ratings did not carry the information they expected, it was 
too late. 
When investors lodged their claims, they reconnected (reembedded) to the system as a whole 
and to the entity of reference in particular. At that point, they realized that the symbolic token 
in which they trusted had been misleading. 
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6. Data and Analysis 
With the publication of the FCIR, a comprehensive description of the crisis became available. 
The commission described its own task as follows: “Our task was first to determine what 
happened and how it happened so that we could understand why it happened” (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011, p. xv). We use this report to analyze how the crisis was explained 
ex post. We acknowledge that this report is not necessarily an objective description; however, 
it is the most comprehensive document of the crisis. The report states that “the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission was created to ‘examine the causes of the current financial and economic 
crisis in the United States.’ In this report, the Commission presents to the President, the 
Congress, and the American people the results of its examination and its conclusions as to the 
causes of the crisis” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, p. xi). 
A central goal of the report is to uncover the causes of the financial crisis, which we analyze 
from a systems theoretical standpoint. We note that the descriptions made here can be 
deconstructed at any point. In this respect, our study also addresses distinctions the commission 
made based on other distinctions made earlier. It stands in the tradition of the poststructuralist 
body of thought (Baudrillard 1994, 2005; Deleuze 1992, 1994; Derrida 1978, 2004; Lyotard 
1984). 
Nevertheless, we find much evidence of both investors’ lack of understanding of the 
complexity and the disembedding of the ratings as symbolic tokens. In summary, the report 
highlights that investors had no real basis on which to evaluate securities and, worse, did not 
realize this disembedding and the changing purpose of the ratings. 
We next provide evidential support of our hypotheses. We use excerpts from the FCIR 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011) to illustrate; emphasis is our own. 
 
6.1. Support for Hypothesis 1 
In support of H1, we found that 45 passages in the text (sentences or sections) refer to 
“understanding” or “not understanding”; six refer to the understanding of the crisis as a whole. 
For example, “Our task was first to determine what happened and how it happened so that we 
could understand why it happened” (p. xv). 
Some examples of the other 39 passages follow: 
 “The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored 
warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks within a system 
essential to the well-being of the American public” (p. xvii). 
 “There was no comprehensive and strategic plan for containment, because they lacked a 
full understanding of the risks and interconnections in the financial markets” (p. xxi). 
 “Senior executives—particularly at three of the leading promoters of CDOs 
[collateralized debt obligations], Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and UBS—apparently did not 
accept or perhaps even understand the risks inherent in the products they were creating” 
(p. 188). 
 On the organizational level, “ ’the firm did not have an adequate, firm-wide consolidated 
understanding of its risk factor sensitivities,’ the supervisors wrote in an internal 
November 19 memo describing meetings with Citigroup management” (p. 303), and 
“major firms and investors blindly relied on credit rating agencies as their arbiters of 
risk” (p. xvii). 
In summary, we conclude that the report supports H1. 
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6.2. Support for Hypothesis 2 
Here, we provide an example of a passage that supports H2: When Lewis Ranieri was 
interviewed by the commission, he reported that when he presented the concept of non-agency 
securitization to policy makers they asked him, “ ‘This stuff is so complicated how is anybody 
going to know? How are the buyers going to buy?’ ” Ranieri answered, “ ‘One of the solutions 
was, it had to have a rating. And that put the rating services in the business’ ” (p. 68). In systems 
theoretical language, the rating is a differentiation indicating ‘good’ and bad” securities. It goes 
without saying that rating agencies exist; it is more notable how the rating agencies 
disconnected investors and securities. More precisely, the rating agencies and their ratings were 
positioned between securities and investors: “This complexity transformed the three leading 
credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch—into key players in the 
process, positioned between the issuers and the investors of securities” (p. 43). 
In this sense, the disconnection between investors and securities (originally apparent because 
investors did not fully understand securities) now manifested in the rating agencies and their 
ratings. In other words, most investors needed simpler and independent information. In the 
FCIR, Jim Callahan, chief executive officer of PentAlpha, a firm that services the securitization 
industry, is quoted as saying, “ ‘The rating agencies were important tools to do that because 
you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in 
the mortgage business. [. . . ] They were looking for an independent party to develop an 
opinion.’ ” (p. 44). The report also notes that Callahan had “years ago . . . worked on some of 
the earliest securitizations” (p. 44). 
Agencies (expert systems) used mathematical models (symbolic tokens) to ensure these 
independent ratings: “Financial institutions and credit rating agencies embraced mathematical 
models as reliable predictors of risks, replacing judgment in too many instances. Too often, 
risk management became risk justification” (p. xix). Expert judgments were essentially 
substituted by mathematical models, with no access points even for experts; even the expert 
system disconnected from the symbolic token. 
Furthermore, many passages refer to a lack of transparency. One such example is as 
follows: “Lack of transparency contributed greatly to the crisis: the exposures of financial 
institutions to risky mortgage assets and other potential losses were unknown to market 
participants, and indeed many firms did not know their own exposures” (p. 386). 
Rating systems were established, among other reasons, to bridge the world of overwhelming 
variety of securities and uninformed investors. Thereby rating agencies were positioned 
between the issuers and investors of securities. Therefore, we conclude that the report supports 
H2. 
 
6.3. Support for Hypothesis 3 
Usually, lay actors trust expert systems if there are no conflicting interests—or, more precisely, 
if they are not aware of conflicting interests in the expert system. Investors understood rating 
agencies as independent parties, as exemplified by the quote from Jim Callahan cited in §6.2. 
He stated that lay investors “were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion” (p. 
44); these “opinions” were condensed into the well-known letter ratings (“AAA” for S&P and 
Fitch and “Aaa” for Moody’s). 
However, rating agencies were operating in an environment of increasing conflicts of 
interests. We note the first hint of divergent interests in the following statement made by the 
commission in the report: “You will also read about the forces at work behind the breakdowns 
at Moody’s, including the flawed computer models, the pressure from financial firms that paid 
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for the ratings, the relentless drive for market share, the lack of resources to do the job despite 
record profits, and the absence of meaningful public oversight” (p. xxv). Financial firms 
pressured the rating agencies, and investors were unaware. A more direct hint of conflict of 
interests is evidenced by the following statement: “Put simply and most pertinently, structured 
finance was the mechanism by which subprime and other mortgages were turned into complex 
investments often accorded triple-A ratings by credit rating agencies whose own motives were 
conflicted” (p. 28). And, even worse, “participants in the securitization industry realized that 
they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. 
Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired 
ratings” (p. 44). 
In addition, new rules in the rating business strengthened the disconnection between rating 
agencies and a fair evaluation of securities. One such rule, the Recourse Rule, was introduced 
in 2001 to govern how much capital a bank needed to hold against securitized assets. As noted 
in the FCIR, “The Recourse Rule also imposed a new framework for asset-backed securities. 
The capital requirement would be directly linked to the rating agencies’ assessment of the 
tranches. Holding securities rated AAA or AA required far less capital than holding lower-
rated investments. For example, $100 invested in AAA or AA mortgage-backed securities 
required holding only $1060 in capital (the same as for securities backed by government-
sponsored enterprises). But the same amount invested in anything with a BB rating required 
$16 in capital, or 10 times more. . . . The new requirements put the rating agencies in the 
driver’s seat. How much capital a bank held depended in part on the ratings of the securities it 
held” (p. 100). However, nobody expected AAA-rated securities to fail: “Meanwhile, banks 
and regulators were not prepared for significant losses on triple-A mortgage-backed securities, 
which were, after all, supposed to be among the safest investments. Nor were they prepared 
for ratings downgrades due to expected losses, which would require banks to post more 
capital” (p. 100). This passage indicates that AAA-rated securities were expected to be the 
safest investments. 
There ratings were not questioned, though they were disconnected from the quality of 
securities; investors still trusted the symbolic token AAA. Only a few people recognized this 
process of change of the “rules”; one of them was Herb Sandler, who, as “co-founder of the 
mortgage lender Golden West Financial Corporation, which was heavily loaded with option 
ARM [adjustable-rate mortgage] loans, wrote a letter to officials at the Federal Reserve, the 
FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Company], the OTS [Office of Thrift Supervision], and the 
OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] warning that regulators were ‘too dependent’ 
on ratings agencies and ‘there is a high potential for gaming when virtually any asset can be 
churned through securitization and transformed into a AAA-rated asset, and when a multi-
billion dollar industry is all too eager to facilitate this alchemy’ ” (p. 20). The logic was turned 
upside down: capital endowments, which were originally indicated by ratings, were based on 
those ratings: “Tying capital standards to the views of rating agencies would come in for 
criticism after the crisis began. It was ‘a dangerous crutch,’ former Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson testified to the Commission” (p. 100). Investors did not recognize this: “While 
investors in the lower-rated tranches received higher interest rates because they knew there was 
a risk of loss, investors in the triple-A tranches did not expect payments from the mortgages to 
stop. This expectation of safety was important, so the firms structuring securities focused on 
achieving high ratings. In the structure of this Citigroup deal, which was typical, $737 million, 
or 78%, was rated triple-A” (p. 72). These passages indicate that the rating was not connected 
to a solid evaluation of investments. However, regulators realized this danger too late, and the 
crisis came on quickly, as our Concluding Hypothesis implies. 
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7. Discussion 
The approach presented here conceptualizes ratings as a service and, in particular, trust in this 
type of service. Modern societies have developed to a degree of labor division such that many 
services are faceless and can be used without knowing the people who performed them. Social 
systems theory (Giddens 1991a, Luhmann 1995) has focused on trust in this kind of service 
and point out that trust is “not upon faith in the ‘moral uprightness’ (good intentions) of others” 
(Giddens 1991a, p. 34); trust in faceless service “rests upon faith in the correctness of which 
one is ignorant” (Giddens 1991a, pp. 33–34) because one is not an expert. The current study 
discusses securities ratings as a faceless service within Giddens’s systemic frame. In this frame, 
rating agencies can be understood as expert systems and their ratings as symbolic tokens. In 
addition, investors perceived the ratings as a trustable service they could use for decision 
making. 
Symbolic tokens are in danger of disembedding from reality; that is, first, the information 
they carry disconnects from the object, and second, the symbolic token drifts away from the 
information it was originally intended to carry. The ratings were originally intended to carry 
trustworthy information about securities; however, they were used increasingly to sell these 
securities. The information they carried drifted away from the original intention and thus 
became untrustworthy. From the investors’ perspective, this drifting was not noticeable because 
they were not expert enough to prove the ratings and still believed that the ratings were made 
without any conflict of interest. Thus, the investors did not know that the ratings misinformed 
them. 
Furthermore, the investors were unaware that they did not know. The situation in which a 
person is unaware that he or she does not know is experienced as knowing. For example, if a 
student gives an answer to a question in a written examination, she must believe that this answer 
is right; otherwise, she would not have written it down. The teacher, however, knows that the 
answer is wrong. Thus, the student knows neither the answer nor that she does not know the 
answer; thus, she believes that she knows and remains believing so until the teacher tells her 
that the answer is wrong. Investors were in a similar situation: they believed they knew because 
they did not know that they did not know. 
In modern societies, information is an important service, and using this faceless service 
implies trust in it. When lay actors use this service, they may not be aware of the drift in its 
accuracy. The more differentiated a society is, the more expert systems and symbolic tokens as 
faceless services are established; consequently, people simply cannot be aware of the entities 
of reference because there is too much knowledge in the world for a single person. Researchers 
have extensively discussed the danger of disconnection of symbolic tokens in the postmodern 
(Lyotard 1984) and poststructuralist (Baudrillard 1994, 2005; Derrida 1978, 2004) literature 
streams. It also has been discussed in finance (Macintosh et al. 2000) and jurisprudence 
(Rüthers 2005). This study is the first application to our knowledge of these thoughts to 
financial services and to ratings agencies in particular. It shows how important it is to 
understand that the information signs might carry is merely one of several distinctions (Bateson 
1970, Spencer-Brown 1969). It is also important to understand abstract systems as a 
consequence of modernity (Giddens 1991a), particularly if a service is based on expert systems 
or symbolic tokens. Our analysis of the financial crisis report indicates that crises in service 
systems are not based purely on individuals’ moral or legal responsibilities and people’s trust 
in them. Trust as conceptualized in abstract systems is not an issue of morality or legitimacy 
but rather a question of enabling cooperation between different social systems, which often 
results in expert systems or symbolic tokens on the one hand and lay actors on the other. This 
kind of trust is based on the connection to an entity of reference. If this connection is lost, trust 
can make it worse. 
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8. Implications and Further Research 
This conclusion has far-reaching implications. Recall the Internet crisis connected to the dot-
com bubble at the turn of the millennium. Was this perhaps a consequence of faceless 
informational services provided but not fully understood? Was it a situation in which many 
investors thought they knew but did not know that they did not know? They may have thought 
that they knew because it may have seemed that everyone was investing in the Internet. If many 
people followed this reasoning, investors might have believed that it was sound. However, they 
eventually discovered that they did not really know what they were doing. Thus, after they 
failed, they realized that they did not know. 
Some forces in modern societies (e.g., WikiLeaks) propose that all people should have access 
to all information. In contrast, others claim that people who have no expertise about the 
concerns this information describes cannot understand or correctly evaluate it. Therefore, they 
maintain that a main service function of journalism is to screen, evaluate, and explain this 
information to society. Thus, service scientists could fruitfully study informational services not 
only from a journalistic or stakeholder perspective but also from a systems perspective. 
In addition, social media are a powerful force in today’s society. For example, recent research 
has discussed social media as channels for marketing (Mangold and Faulds 2009) and social 
networks (Kwak et al. 2010). However, social networks are not necessarily service networks. 
Löbler (2013) proposes the idea of service-dominant networks. Together with the idea of 
abstract systems, these ideas present new opportunities to investigate social media as faceless 
services and to investigate their trustworthiness in particular. It is important for further research 
to distinguish trust between individuals and trust in abstract systems (Giddens 1991a, p. 83). 
Valenzuela et al. (2009) show that social trust as faith in people is positively related to the 
intensity of Facebook use among young adults. However, what is the cause and what is the 
effect are not clear. What about trust in Facebook and other social media as abstract systems? 
Is trust in Facebook (or in those using Facebook) a similar danger for young people as it was 
for investors when trusting rating agencies? 
In the academic world, journal rankings, university ratings, and other types of evaluations 
are pervasive. Are these ratings becoming symbolic tokens and thereby an independent media 
of interchange? If so, are they still connected to the intended idea of independent high-quality 
evaluations of research? Or do they become an independent system of their own, drifting away 
from high-quality research to perhaps focus on mainstream research? Are university rankings 
still really reflecting the originally intended information about these complex entities? Or do 
university rankings become self-fulfilling prophecies having their own unintended 
momentum? Do these informational services create value for all or only for some? If they 
create value for some, do they harm others? Academic ratings, rankings, and evaluation 
constitute services; however, they remain underrepresented, or not represented at all, in service 
science and service research. 
These ratings and evaluation in academia have another characteristic not yet discussed: they 
are service on service. For example, teaching is a service. The evaluation of teaching is a 
service on another service. In line with second-order cybernetics (von Foerster 2003), we 
propose to call services such as teaching and cutting hair first-order services and ratings, 
rankings, evaluations, or information of these services second-order services (a service applied 
on a service). Service-dominant logic defines service as the “application of resources for the 
benefit of another party . . . Broadly, resources are of two types: operand, those that require 
some action to be performed on them to have value (e.g., natural resources) and operant, those 
that can be used to act (e.g., human skills and knowledge)” (Vargo and Lusch 2011, p. 184). 
Thus, service is when operant resources work on or with operand resources for the benefit of 
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another party—first-order service as we conceptualize it. Second-order service is when operant 
resources work on or with (first-order) services for the benefit of another party. Thinking in 
terms of second-order services opens the door to analyzing them as self-referential service of 
service, or a second-order phenomenon. Both ideas have a tradition in systems thinking (see, 
e.g., von Foerster 2003 for second-order phenomena and Luhmann 1995 or Maturana and 
Varela 1992 for self-referentiality). In this sense, service science is also a second-order service; 
it provides, among other things, information about service. 
The service literature has not addressed second-order services. Second-order services would 
be ideal candidates for symbolic tokens and thereby candidates for disembedding systems. 
Which of these second-order services are in danger of drifting away from reality, and how can 
the process of disembedding be contained? Can second-order service be designed in such a 
way to support people’s understanding? Or would that make it even worse? The 
aforementioned is only a fraction of the questions that emerge when using a systems 
perspective. Many more areas of fruitful research might exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Allen F, Carletti E (2010) An overview of the crisis: Causes, consequences, and solutions. Internat. Rev. Finance 
10(1):1–26. 
 
Ashby WR (1956) Introduction to Cybernetics (Chapman & Hall, London). 
 
Barile S, Polese F (2010a) Linking the viable system and many-to-many network approaches to service-
dominant logic and service science. Internat. J. Quality Service Sci. 2(1):23–42. 
 
Barile S, Polese F (2010b) Smart service systems and viable service systems. Service Sci. 2(1–2):21–40. 
 
Bateson G (1970) Form, substance and difference. General Semantics Bull. 37:5–13. 
 
Baudrillard J (1994) Simulacrua and Simulation translated by Glaser SF (University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor). 
 
Baudrillard J (2005) The System of Objects translated by Benedict J (Verso Books, London). 
 
Beer S (1972) Brain of the Firm (Penguin Press, London). 
 
Berg D, Einspruch NG (2010) The global 2000 companies and the economic sectors. Service Sci. 2(4):294–297. 
 
Boulding K (1964) General systems as a point of view. Mesarovi´c MD, ed. Views of General Systems Theory 
(John Wiley & Sons, New York),25–38. 
 
Checkland P (1981) Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK). 
 
Crozier M (1963) Le phénomène bureaucratique (Seuil, Paris). 
 
Deleuze G (1992) Woran erkennt man den Strukturalismus? (Merve Verlag, Berlin). 
 
Deleuze G (1994) Difference and Repetition (Athlone Press, London). 
 
16 
 
 
Derrida J (1978) Writing and Difference, translated, with introduction and notes by Bass A (Routledge, London). 
 
Derrida J (2004) Die différance (Reclam Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany). 
 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) The financial crisis inquiry report. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC. 
 
Giddens A (1991a) The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK). 
 
Giddens A (1991b) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in Late Modern Age (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
UK). 
 
Golinelli GM (2010) Viable Systems Approach (VSA): Governing Business Dynamics (CEDAM, Milan). 
 
Hall AD, Fagen RE (1956) Definition of system. General Systems 1(1):18–28. 
 
Kwak H, Lee C, Park H, Moon S (2010) What is Twitter, a social network or a news media? Proc. 19th Internat. 
Conf. World Wide Web (ACM, New York) 591–600. 
 
Löbler H (2013) Service-dominant networks—An evolution from the service-dominant logic perspective. J. 
Service Management 24(4):420–434. 
 
Luhmann N (1995) Social Systems (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA). 
 
Lyotard J-F (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, UK). 
 
Macintosh NB, Shearer T, Thornton DB, Welker M (2000) Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality: 
Perspectives on income and capital. Accounting, Organ. Soc. 25(1):13–50. 
 
Mangold WG, Faulds DJ (2009) Social media: The new hybrid element of the promotion mix. Bus. Horizons 
52(4):357–365. 
 
Maturana HR, Varela FJ (1992) The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding 
(Shambhala Publications, Boston). 
 
Meadows DH (2008) Thinking in Systems: A Primer (Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction, VT). 
 
Polese F, Di Nauta P (2013) A viable systems approach to relationship management in S-D logic and service 
science. Bus. Admin. Rev.73(2):113–129. 
 
Rüthers B (2005) Die Unbegrenzte Auslegung, 6th ed. (Mohr Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen, Germany). 
 
Shannon CE (1998) The mathematical theory of communication. Shannon CE, Weaver W, eds. The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication (University of Illinois Press, Urbana), 29–125. [Orig. published 1949.] 
 
Spencer-Brown G (1969) Laws of Form (George Allen & Unwin, London). 
Stones R (2005) Giddens, Anthony. Ritzer G, ed. Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Vol. 1 (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
CA), 321–326. 
 
Valenzuela S, Park N, Kee KF (2009) Is there social capital in a social network site? Facebook use and college 
students’ life satisfaction, trust, and participation. J. Comput.-Mediated Comm. 14(4):875–901. 
 
Vargo SL, Lusch RF (2004) Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing. J. Marketing 68(1):1–17. 
 
Vargo SL, Lusch RF (2008) Service-dominant logic: Continuing the evolution. J. Acad. Marketing Sci. 36(1):1–
10. 
 
Vargo SL, Lusch RF (2011) It’s all B2B . . . and beyond: Toward a systems perspective of the market. Indust. 
Marketing Management 40(2):181–187. 
 
von Bertalanffy L (1969) General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (Braziller, New 
York). 
 
von Foerster H (2003) Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition (Springer, Berlin). 
 
Weaver W (1998) Some recent contributions to the mathematical theory of communication. Shannon CE, 
Weaver W, eds. The Mathematical Theory of Communication (University of Illinois Press, Urbana), 1–28. [Orig. 
published 1949.] 
 
Weinberg GM (2001) An Introduction to General Systems Thinking (Dorset House Publishing, New York). 
 
Wiener N (1948/1961) Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (MIT Press, 
Boston). 
